7s Model Samsung

Case Study 2. : Trade and Innovation in the Korean Information and Communication Technology Sector1 . Onodera, Osamu Kim, Hanna Earl OECD Journal: General Papers; 2008, Vol. 8 Issue 4, p109-155, 47p, 34 Charts, 20 Graphs This includes the strategy of the organisation, the innovation strategy, the culture in the organisation towards risk-taking and change, the motivation of employees, cross functional learning, knowledge management and the use of internal and external networks. â€Å"Employees’ willingness to take risks very much depends on the existence of a †noblame† culture. A strong culture fosters innovation only if it is built on norms such as accepting failure†¦Ã¢â‚¬  (Goffin & Mitchell, 2005, s. 265). †Multifunctional learning fosters innovative and learning by doing on the part of the employees and help them keep up to date with the latest developments. It also serves as a basis for creating a climate that can bring about organizational transition† (Takeuchi & Nonaka, 1986). â€Å"Organizations need to increase their innovative capacity and one powerful mechanism for doing so is to extend participation in the process to a much wider population. Mobilizing high levels of participation in the innovation process is unfamiliar and, for many organizations, relatively untested and apparently risky† (Bessant, 2003, s. 767). †Mobilizing and managing knowledge becomes a primary task and many recipes offered for achieving this depend on mobilizing a much higher level of participation in innovative problem-solving† (Bessant, 2003, s. 767) †Companies increasingly cannot expect to warehouse their technologies, waiting until their businesses make use of them† (Chesbrough, 2003, p. 32) Thirdly, the 7-S framework contains the very process of innovation. The process is divided into a series of relatively well-known steps in the â€Å"funnel† approach that seems to be standard in theory and praxis these days. However, it has been chosen to illustrate this differently than conventionally, because:†Ã¢â‚¬ ¦ The assumption of a sequential progression without feedback loops and recurring tasks is unreali stic †¦Ã¢â‚¬  (Saren, 1994, s. 633). Hence, the illustration of the process circling the innovation fundamentals. So what is contained within the process element of the 7-S framework? Again this can be illustrated by using a quotation from some of the state-of-the-art literature:† †¦ There is no doubt that for managers to increase the success rate of their new product efforts, they should master techniques for the planning, development, deployment, evaluation and control of necessary competencies throughout the new product (NPD) process, i. e. , from the generation of the new idea to the launch of the product to the marketplace †¦Ã¢â‚¬  (Tzokas et al. , 2004, s. 619). In other words, the innovation process is measured by looking at project management, project planning, top management involvement, project managers, and the application of innovation fundamentals across the seven stages of the process. Companywide, we will build a content-rich business structure that fosters innovation in hardware and software. Building from our creative platform, we will develop new businesses in health, the environment, and renewable energy. A company that epitomises the transformation of the Korean ICT sector is Samsung Electronics. Samsung Electronics is one of the world leaders in semiconductors, in particular DRAMs and fiash memories. Liquid Crystal Displays (LCDs), mobile phones, and digital appliances such as fiat panel TVs. While Samsung had quickly grown from an assembler of black and white TVs in the 196()s to one of the market leaders in DRAMs in the late 1980s, making use of foreign technology and based on foreign markets, it was generally a market follower rather than an innovator even in the late 1980s. Changes in the business environment in the early 1990s, i. . greater competition at the lower end of the market due to the increasing use of evolving production networks in the Asian region by Japanese producers, increased competition in the Korean domestic market due to progressive trade and investment liberalisation, and withdrawal of the generalised system of preference (GSP) privileges in export markets, triggered a transformation of Samsung with a greater emphasis on technology, increased global production and sourcing, and enhanced international sales and distribution. The fact that Samsung now has research facilities not only in Europe, US and Japan but also in Russia, India and most recently China, that it now has 27 manufacturing facilities in 12 countries, with overseas I 1E;CD JOtJRNAL; GENERAL PAreRS – VOLUME 2008/4 – ISSN -IMS-2821  © oe C D 2008 112-CASE STUDY 2 production reaching 35. 9% in 2007, and that it has doubled its sales tietwork from 32 sales organisations in 23 countries in 2000, to 60 in 48 countries iti all regions, shows how global Satnsung's operations have become as a result hich has become one of the leading firms in the ICT industry worldwide from a modest position in the past two decades. The study assesses how regulatory, trade, and investment policy choices have helped, alongside other key policies, to provide the right framework conditions for technology absorption and innovation. In addition, it examines how the private sector, and more particularly Samsung, has taken advantage of those conditions to enhance its innovation capacity. The objective of this study is not to provide a comprehensive history of Korea's development or to evaluate Korea's innovation policy. Rather it is an attempt to shed some light on the relationship between trade and innovation from the recent rapid growth of Korea's ICT industry in the past 15 years. focuses on Samsung's strategies in international R;D, manufacturing, sourcing, supply chain management, sales and distribution. (Other key determinants of Samsung's success include its strong branding and marketing strategy, its investment strategy of investing in large capacity when other companies are cautious, and effective human resource management. The Samsung Group is today the largest chaebol in Korea, which has businesses spanning from electronics and electro-mechanics, shipbuilding and engineering, petrochemicals and fine chemicals, life insurance and securities to trading and constructions. Samsung Electronics is its largest company with 2006 consolidated sales of OECD JOURNAL: GENERAL PAI^RS – VOLUME 2008/4 – [SSN -1995-2S21 O OECD 2U0B CASE STUDY 2 – 1 4 1 USD 92 billion and net income of USD 8. 5 billion. It employs 128 000 people in more than 120 offices in 57 countries, and is organized into five major businesses: semiconductors (memory chips, system LSI devices and hard disc drives), LCDs (TFTLCD products in various applications). Telecommunication networks (mobile phones, telecommunication systems), digital appliances (washing machines, refrigerators, air conditioners and stoves) and digital media (TVs, audio/video products, PCs and computer peripherals) (Samsung. 2006). It is among the global leaders in semiconductor such as DRAM. SRAM chips, and flash memory. CDMA mobile handsets, and digital media technologies such as Liquid Crystal Displays (LCDs), and has fast become a truly global multinational company. For example, value of tbe Samsung brand was USD 16. 1 billion in 2006 in the Brand Value Survey conducted by Business week magazine and Intcrbrand, or 20†³Ã¢â‚¬Ëœ among all corporations in tbe worid and 7†³Ã¢â‚¬Ëœ in the IT sector. Samsung Electronics is also ranked 27'*† in the worid on Fortune magazine's list of Global Most Admired Companies. Samsung's success in particulariy noteworthy in light of two factors: first, the company's medium sized domestic market (Korea has a population of 48 million) and, second, its origins and recent history. Samsung started off in 1938 as a trading company, and while it entered two manufacturing sectors {i. e. sugar and textiles) in the mid-1950s, it was not until 1969 that the firm entered the electronics industry with the incorporation of Samsung Electronics Co. One major characteristic of Samsung's entry into the electronics industry was its reliance on foreign technology. ^^ Table 21 provides a brief overview of Samsung's evolution to the 1990s. Table 21. Samsung tecbnological capabilities and features of international production 1970s 1980s 1990s 20008 Key activities Main sources of capabilities Level of technologicai capabilities International production and scope of interaction Conglomerate diversification J/V partners, Original Equipment f/lanufacturer (OEM) buyers and overseas training Capabilities in mass production (TVs) Entry into DRAM market OEM buyers, foreign licensing, reverse engineering Broader product range (VCR, MWO, DRAfvl, components) but very weak in ability to introduce a major change of product US & EC for lowend markets (limited success). Centralised intrafirm interaction Organisational reform, internationalisation Acquisitions. strategic alliances, in-house R&D Continued weakness in product development International production of lowend items in peripheral regions. Moving toward decentralised intraand inter-firm interaction Transformation into a global company. In-house R&D, strategic alliances and increasing emphasis on intellectual property. Strengthened R&D and design capabilities, with a core competency in product development. Creation of a global production network ainly in the Asian region but also in other parts of the globe as well. Source : Kim (1994) for 1970s – 1990s. IH-XD JOl'RN. M. : GENERAL PAPERS – VOLl/ME 2008/4 -ISSN -1995-2821  ©OECD 2008 142-CASE STUDY 2 1970s – Dependence on foreign technology Given its lack of expetience in electronics, Samsung had no choice but to turn to foreign sources of technology in management, production in marketing and Samsung established a close relationship with Japanese and US firms. It created several joint ventures with foreign technology suppliers such as NEC, Sanyo, Corning Glass Works and other companies. ^ It reached numerous agreements to assemble electronic products for foreign original equipment manufacturer (OEM) buyers, who provided it with design and engineering support as well as with an international market. Samsung also relied extensively on outside suppliers for the purchase of core components. However. Samsung and its affiliated partners have increased its capabilities for parts supply and for some parts even began to ship parts to Korean and Japanese customers. Samsung electronics expanded and improved its assembling capacity, producing ten million black and white TV sets by the end of the 1970s. Most sales were through OEM channels. OEM buyers provided Samsung with product design, quality control and engineering support, leaving Samsung to increase its manufacturing capability. Samsung continued to increase access to other international distributors and was able to renegotiate TU and ease initial geographical restrictions imposed by its jomt venture partners. † Samsung expanded its OEM channels and capabilities by adding two new products – VCRs and microwave ovens. As Samsung was unable to gain foreign licensing for these products, it used â€Å"reverse engineering†, and succeeded in developing its own microwave in 1978 and VCR in 1979. Samsung further diversified into the telecommunication sector through a 1977 JV with GTE of the US. In 1974, Samsung acquired Korea Semiconductor Co. (KSC), a joint venture between Korea Engineering & Manufacturing Co. and Integrated Circuit International, a US firm, which manufactured simple integrated circuits for electr onic watches, which formed the basis for Samsung's entry into the dynamic random access memories (DRAMs) business. 980s and early 1990s – Upgrading of technology – entry into DRAMs The 1980s was the period of expansion and diversification for Samsung. As Samsung began to experience limitations on growth in the CTW and VCR markets due to lack of component availability. Samsung made a decision to enter the IC business. To achieve its objective, Samsung once again tried to learn foreign technology through a broad range of formal and informal contacts, and decided to enter the DRAM market which was considered more suitable for Samsung which had familiarity with incremental process innovation and large scale manufacturing efficiency both of which could become sources of competitive advantage in this sector. In 1983, Samsung licensed a DRAM design from Micron Technology, a US company, and entered the merchant market for DRAMs which require the most advanced manufacturing technologies and huge capital outlays. In 1983, Samsung successfully developed a 64K-DRAM, followed by a 256K in 1984. and a lM DRAM in 1986. Samsung continued to upgrade its technology and decreased its reliance on outside technology, except for capital equipment and thus rose from a virtually zero share in memory chips in 1984 to be the world market leader in DRAMs by 1992. Table 22 shows how Samsung has gradually caught up with technology leaders: Samsung kept closing the gap between itself and the technology leaders, and has been the leader in DRAM development since 1992 when it the first company in the worid to develop 64 Mbit DRAM. OECD JOURNAL: GENERAL PAPERS – VOLUME 2008/4 – ISSN -1995-2821 O OECD ZIKlti CASE STUDY 2 – 1 4 3 Table 22. Samsung technology gap in DRAM 64Kbit' 256Kbit IMblt 4Mbit' 16Mblt 64Mbit 256Mblt IGbIt 4GbIt First development company Intel NEC Toshiba Hitachi ^^jj^^†^^ Samsung Samsung Samsung Samsung Development date by Leader 06/1979 01/1981 07/1984 08/1987 08/1992 08/1994 11/1996 12/2000 Development dale by Samsung 12/1983 01/1984 06/1986 02/1988 07/1990 08/1992 08/1994 '11/1996 '12/2000 Gap between Leader and Samsunq ^^^†Ã¢â‚¬ ^ ^ ^^^^^ ^ ^^^'^ ^ months 3 months – . . . 1 Design licensing from Micron Technology; Process technology from Sharp 2 Samsung with two Korean partners Source. Kim (1997), Siegel and Chang (2006), Samsung website (http://www. samsung. com). By the late 1980s, Samsung was able to produce a wide variety of semiconductors for use in phone sets, computers, private automatic branch exchanges (PABXs). acsimile machines, and VCRs (Kim. 1997). As a result, it was able to reduce dependency on Japanese suppliers for core components. Nonetheless the majority of the DRAMs produced in Korea were exported to foreign countries and the other non-memory chips required (I. e. microprocessors) continued to be imported from other countries (Kim , 1998). The strong resource shift to semiconductors meant that development of other capabilities suffered to some extent. While Samsung Electronics Co. had a minor change capability, it remained weak in major change capability (Kim, 1997). As a result, it continued to use license technology from foreign companies for its main export products in this period. ‘ OEM channels remained dominant in the company sales at over 65% of total sales even in 1988. and Samsung maintained close relationships with OEM buyers such as JC Penney, Sears Roebuck, GTE, Toshiba, IBM, Hewlett Packard, RCA and Crown Corporation (Kim. 1997). It was towards the end of the 1980s that Samsung slowly started to build its own technological capability with the acquisition in 1988 of Micro Five Corporation, a US company, and with the establishment of Samsung Infonnation Systems America Inc. SISA) in Silicon Valley to support export activities as well as to gather information on ICT products. It was also in this period that Samsung began its search for foreign talent as a means to compensate for its lack of internal expertise (Box 3). It was also in the 1980s that Samsung started to internationalise its production for certain products such as colo ur TVs, audio products and microwave ovens. Samsung also sowed the seeds of its telecom business at this time, acquiring Korea Telecommunications in 1980 and started production of a cellular phone in 1986. Box 3, Technology transfer through hiring One of the ways Samsung has overcome its lack of technical capabilities has been through recruiting top level engineers from world leading competitors. ^† In early days, Samsung focused on recruiting Korean engineers working at foreign companies. Hwang Chang-gyu, a former president of Samsung Electronics, was recruited from Intel, and Chin Daeje. another former president, worked at IBM's Watson Research Center before being hired by Samsung, to name just a few. These people have significantly contributed to the transformation of Samsung from a me-too memory producer to the world leader by bringing cutting-edge technical knowledge and managerial skills. Samsung also hired foreigners in order to fill the gap it identifies to upgrade its technical capabilities. It is widely known that Shigeo Fukuda, who was hired from Kyocera, played a critical role in the Samsung's new initiative in 1993 known as â€Å"New Management. † It is believed that his critical comments on Samsung during the 1980s pushed the company to enhance its product development processes and design capabilities. More recently hiring has become increasingly diverse from all over the world including David Still (US), David Henri (France). Roman Sepeda (US). Nelson Allen {US). Hao In (China), and Tung Wang (China). OECD JOURNAI. : GENERAL PAPERS – VOLUME 2008/4 – ISSN -1995-282! O OECD 2008 144-CASE STUDY 2 Transformation into a global company – 1993 and onwards Several changes in the business environment faced Samsung in tbe early 1990s. First, lower trade barriers and transportation costs and enhanced ICT from the latter 1980s and the 1990s resulted in greater fragmentation of the ICT industry. In the late 1980s, Japanese producers rapidly increased overseas production in response to increased competition from Korean competitors and the rapid appreciation of the yen, which led to greater competition at the lower end of the market. Secondly, Korea's domestic electronics market which had long been protected from foreign competition was gradually liberalised as Korea prepared to join the ranks of industrial nations. † In 1989. import quotas on consumer electronics were removed. By 1993 there was a plan to cut the average tariff rate below 10% for all imported electronics goods. The number of items subject to the import diversification programme wbich shielded the Korean market from Japanese competitors was steadily decreased with a schedule put in place for abolition in 1999. Thirdly, on the export side, the generalised system of preferences privileges were withdrawn from Korean electronics goods by the US and EC in 1988. The Won also started to appreciate against the dollar making exports from Korea less attractive. The above changes in the business environment led to a strong initiative headed by the Chairman Kun-Hee-Lee in 1993 lo become a truly global company. ‘ Under this new initiative, Samsung began its transformation from a successful company to one of the global leaders in the industry. There was a renewed emphasis placed on quality, and several new products were subsequently introduced such as the TFT-LCD and CDMA mobile handsets. The Asian financial crisis presented a further challenge as the domestic market plunged, and Samsung had to unde rgo a fundamental restructuring of its activities, exiting from numerous businesses, cutting 30% of its workforce and cutting its debt-toequity ratio from 300% to 30%. However, the Asian crisis also presented an opportunity for Samsung to consolidate its domestic market as competitors weakened their positions, while shifting more of its resources to the Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) and mobile phone businesses which has allowed it to diversify its revenues. The growth has been particularly strong in the CDMA mobile handset market, where Samsung has leapt from almost a negligible share in the global market to number one in CDMA pbones with a share of about 30%, and number two in the global market overall bebind Nokia. Below we focus on three main strategic responses of Samsung: greater emphasis on technology, global productions and sourcing, and international sales and distribution. Greater focus on technology (globalisation of R&D and strategic alliances) Samsung's R;D expenditure in Korea bas continuously increased both in terms of amount and as a percentage of sales, on average 18% annually from 2002 to 2006, and now approaches 10% of total sales (Figure 21). ‘^ Tbe proportion of R&D staff has jumped from 16% in 1997 to 24% in 2006, and the company plans to push it up to 32% by 2010. The number of scientists and engineers at various research centres in Korea has increased by 70% since 2001. Table 23 indicates how Samsung has aggressively recruited scientists and engineers with graduate degrees; tbe number of Ph. D. ‘s is up by 50% and the number of Master's degree holders has been more tban doubled. Samsung bas also changed its patenting activities since the early 1990s (Table 24). While Samsung only bad 1 704 patents for applications made before 1994, it was granted over 2 600 patents for applications made in the three yeai- period 1994-1996, and has consistently been granted over 1 000 patents since then. * This shows how Samsung has OECD JOURNAL: GENERAL PAPERS – VOLUME 2008/4 – ISSN -IWS-2821  ® OECD 200s CASESTUDY2-145 become aggressive in the application of patents in the United States as part of its technology strategy. Figure 21. Samsung Electronics R&D expenditures 12. 00* 10,00% 0. 00% 2002 2UU3 2001 2005 2006 Table 23. Nunfiber of scientist and engineers in Samsung research laboratories Period Ph. D. Master's Bachelor Total 2001-02 2003-04 2005-06 1 039 873 1 537 2 980 3 453 8 320 6 038 6815 7 363 10 057 11 141 17 220 Table 24. Number of Samsung patents in the United States 1 Patents by year of grant Patents by application year Patents by year of grant {cont. ) Patents by application year (cont. ) Pre-1994 850 1 704 2001 1 446 1 550 1994 412 498 2002 1 328 1 804 1995 423 656 2003 1 313 2412 1996 485 1 532 2004 1 604 2 005 1997 584 1 613 2005 1 641 890 1998 1 305 1 845 2006 2 451 216 1999 1 542 1470 2007 2 723 13 2000 1 437 1 336 Total 19 544 19 544 Source : Based on US Patent and Trademark Office (2007). Samsung's efforts to strengthen its research capabilities have not been limited to Korea. In order to improve responsiveness to the local demand conditions and tap into the pool of cutting edge scientists and engineers, the company established R&D centres in various paits of the worid (Table 24). Samsung started by setting up Samsung Information Systems America (SISA) in Silicon Valley in 1988, followed by Samsung Electronics Research Institute in London in 1991. These two research facilities are typical examples of R&D facilities set up to monitor abroad as is the case with the Dallas and OECD JOURNAL: GENERAL PAPERS – VOLUME 2008/4 – ISSN -1995-2821 O CffiCD 2008 †¢ ] †¢ †¢ ‘ 146-CASESTUDY2 Yokohama facilities in 1997. More interestingly, the company has rapidly expanded its global network of research centres with the objective of utilising the foreign pool of research talent starting with Russia (1993), India (1996) and the three recently added research centres in China focusing on semiconductor, mobile telecommunications, and electronics. Samsung has also seriously increased the size and capabilities of the foreign research centres: its research centre in Moscow had only one Ph. D. and seven Masters in 2001 and now has ten Ph. D. ‘s and 29 Masters; its Bangalore software facility had no Ph. D. , 17 Masters, and 37 Bachelors in 2001 and now hires four Ph. D. ‘s, 179 Masters, and 164 Bachelors. Table 25. Samsung R;D facilities Research centre Samsung Information Systems America Samsung Electronics Research Institute Moscow Samsung Research Centre Samsung Electronics India Software Operations Dallas Telecom Laboratory Samsung Telecom Research Israel Samsung Yokohama Research Institute Beijing Samsung Telecommunication Samsung Semiconductor China R;D Samsung Electronics China R;D Location San Jose London Moscow Bangalore Dallas Yakum Yokohama Beijing Suzhou Nanjing Established 1988 1991 1993 1996 1997 1997 1997 2000 2003 2004 Core tasks Strategic parts and components, core technologies Mobile phones and digital TV software Optics, software algorithms and other new technologies System software for digital products, protocols for wired/wireless networks and handsets Next generation telecommunications systems Hebrew software for mobile phones Core next-generation parts and components, digital technologies Mobile telecommunications standardization and commercialization for China Semiconductor packages and solutions Software, digital TVs and MP3 players for Chin While, Samsung had already begun to use strategic alliances especially for acquiring technologies, the increasing R;D capabilities of Samsung is allowing it to benefit from strategic alliances in developing new cutting edge technologies (Table 26). Because there is an increasing convergence of technologies, for example between telecommunications and broadcasting, mobile phones and personal computers, telecommunication equipment and household appliances, it is becoming increasingly difficult and expensive to conduct the research and development necessary to cover all technology areas in one company. Samsung, therefore, has been using its technology base to conduct strategic alliances to build new strategic capabilities. OECD JOURNAL: GEKERAL PAPERS – VOLUME 2008/4 – ISSN -1993-2821 O OECD 2130 » i' Partners Table 26. Date Selection of recent strategic alliances Areas of cooperation CASE STUDY 2 -Ul Nokia April 2007 Limo Alcatel Sony (S-LCD) IBM Intel & Microsoft Discovery Salvarani Sun Microsystems VDL Charter Bang & Olufsen Kent State University Qualcomm Toshiba (TSST) Sony (S-LCD) IBM Dell Hewlett-Packard Disney Napster Sony NEC Matsushita Microsoft January 2007 October 2006 July 2006 March 2006 March 2006 September 2005 July 2005 July 2005 February 2005 January 2005 November 2004 October 2004 July 2004 April 2004 Maroh 2004 March 2004 January 2004 September 2003 September 2003 September 2003 August 2003 July 2003 January 2003 November 2001 Co-develop technology for handsets and DVB-H standardisation solutions Establish a joint venture for developing a Linux platform (SAMSUNG Electronics, Vodafone. DoCoMo, Motorola and NEC) Cooperate on satellite DVB-H Jointly invest in 8th-generation LCD line (2200mm x 2500mm motherglass) Co-develop and market technologies for industrial printer solutions Co-develop UMPCs Cooperate on high-definition contents Co-develop new built in products combining household electronics and furniture Cooperation in solution business and next-generation business computing systems Cooperate in commercialisation of terrestrial DMB Co-develop cable broadcasting receiver and set-tcp box for digital TV Full Duplex service Partner in home theatre business Co-develop display technologies Cooperation in MDDI (Mobile Display Data Interface) technology Develop and market optical storage devices Establish joint venture for 7th generation LCD (1870 x 2200 mm) line Co-develop nano-logic process technologies Supply multi-functional laser printers Share technology for ink-jet printers Supply â€Å"Movie Beam† set-top box for VOD Co-develop and market SAMSUNG-Napster player Expand and consolidate memory stick business Cooperate in high-end business computer systems Standardise technology, co-produce and jointly market DVD recorders Co-develop digital household electronics Source: Based on Samsung homepage. OECD JOURNAL; GENERAL PAPERS – VOLUME 20U8/4 – ISSN -1995-2821 O OECD 2008 148-CASE STUDY 2 Globalisation of the production network and global sourcing Samsung Electronics began to build its global production network in the early 1980s when it established its first manufacturing facilities in the U. S. and Portugal. It went on to establish a subsidiary in the UK (1987). Mexico (1988) and Thailand in 1988. Since then, the company has continued to expand the network by adding new countries to the network as well as setting up new facilities in countries where it has already established its production facility. In 1989. Samsung further set up production subsidiaries in Spain, China. Hungary and Turkey. Table 27 lists the countries where the company has its production facilities and illustrates that the company has been selectively expanding its global production network. Table 28 shows how overseas production is gradually increasing in recent years reaching 35. 9% in 2007. It should be noted that while this figure is a measurable increase from the levels in tbe early 1990s, it remains considerably smaller than comparable figures for Japanese electronics companies which exceeded 70% as of the early 1990s (Table 8). The major products manufactured in overseas facilities are consumer electronics products such as TVs. VCRs, refrigerators, and microwave ovens. The company's Mexican production subsidiaries produce flat-screen TVs and LCD TVs and export them to the US and other Latin American countries. As Mexico is a member of NAFTA, Samsung's exports to the U. S. from Mexican plants are exempt of import tariffs. Samsung Electronics Hungarian Co. Ltd.. established in 1989, produces 3. 2 million TVs annually and exports them to Western and Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. † ‘ Recently, Samsung announced to increase its production capacity of the mobile phone manufacturing plant in Haryana, India from one million to three million units per year. In addition to the importance of the local market, India is considered as a strategic alternative to China to hedge tbe uncertainty from relying heavily on Chinese operations. â€Å"†Ã¢â‚¬Ëœ In the semiconductor sector, Samsung pursues a triad strategy: Giheung complex in Korea as the R&D and frontier semiconductor manufacturing hub. the American facilities in Austin. Texas as strategic manufacturing hub for the Americas, and the Suzbou complex in China as the global testing and packaging hub. ^^ Table 27. Samsung electronics global production network* Korea North America Asia Pacific Europe South America Middle East and Africa CIS 2000 Six Facilities Mexico, U. S. China(7), India, lndonesia(2), Maiaysia(2), Thaiiand, Vietnam Hungary, Spain, U. K. Brazil None Uzbekistan 2006 Eight Facilities Canada, Mexico(2}, U. S. Ct]ir)a(13). india(2). Indonesia, Malaysia(2), Philippines, Thaiiand, Vietnam Hungary, Slovaiiia None None None † The number in parentheses is tlie number ol subsidiaries in the country; Countries in italics are those newly added to the list between 2000 and 2006. Source: Samsung Electronics' website (www. amsung. com/us). OECD JOURNAL: GENERAL PAPERS – VOLUME 2008/4 – ISSN -I9;I5-282I O OECD 2008 CASE STUDY 2 – 1 4 9 Table 28. Samsung production network (KRW million) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total Domestic production Overseas production 64 817 456 100% 43 582 016 67. 2% 21 235 440 32. 8% 81 57 24 963 009 100% 632 359 70. 3% 330 650 29. 7% 80 629 510 100% 57 457 670 71. 3% 23 171 840 28. 7% 85 58 26 834604 100% 972 765 68. 7% 861 839 31. 3% 98 507 817 100% 63 175 968 64. 1% 35 331 849 35. 9% Source: Korean Government. International sales and distribution Samsung's initial expansion of international sales was through Samsung Corporation, the group affiliate involved in general overseas trading in the early 1970s. While this may have aided Samsung initially, it blocked Samsung Electronics† further expansion and in 1978, Samsung established its own sales affiliate in the United States for the first time. Since then, Samsung Electronics has continuously expanded its sales and distribution network around the world (Table 29). In 2000, the company had a network of 32 sales organizations in 23 countries and its primary emphasis was on North American and European markets. However, the company doubled its sales subsidiaries to 60 in 48 countries over six years, and it is now paying more attention to emerging markets, including Asia Pacific. Middle East, Africa. CIS, and South America. According to Samsung Electronics' homepage as of 2008, Samsung had a total of 53 sales subsidiaries and branch ofllces in 36 countries. ^'^ Samsung has achieved over three quarters of its sales overseas in recent years (Table 30). Table 29. Samsung electronics global network of sales subsidiaries* 2000 2006 North America Canada, Mexico, United States (6) Canada, Mexico, United States (4) Asia Pacific Europe South America Middle East and Africa CIS Australia, Hong Kong. India, Japan, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan France, Germany{2), Italy, Poland, Portugai, Sweden, The Netherlands(2), U. K. (2) Argentina, Colombia, Panama South Africa, U. A. E. Russia Australia, China(6). Hong Kong. lndia(2). Indonesia. Japan. Malaysia. Pakistan. Philippines, Singapore. Taiwan, Thailand. Vietnam Austria, France, Germany(2), Greece, Hungary. Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Netherlands. U. K. (2 Argentina, Brazil. Chile, Colombia, Panama, Peru Algeria. Iran. Jordan, Kenya. Morocco. Nigeria. Saudi Arabia. South Africa. Tunisia. Turkey. U. A. E. Kazakhstan. Russia. Ukraine. Uzbekistan The number in parentheses is the number of subsidiaries in the country; COUNTRIES in italics are those newly added to the list between 2000 and 2006. Source: Samsung Eiectronics' website (www. samsung. com/us). UKCD JOURNAL: GENERAL PAPERS – VOLUME 2008/4 – ISSN -1W5-2S2I  © OECD 2008 150-CASE STUDY 2 Table 30. Samsung sates network 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Domestic sales Overseas sales % of overseas sales to total Source : Korean Government